Maël van Beek
  • About
  • Research
  • Papers
  • Teaching
  • CV
  • Projects
    • Great powers, international orders, and war
    • Public preferences and international bargaining
    • Social science data scarcity
  • Papers
    • Hierarchy and War
    • A Direct Method for the Estimation of Temporal Preferences
    • A Preferences-based Theory of Audience Costs
    • Alliance Management in the Face of Public Opinion: Experimental Evidence from the United States, Japan, and South Korea
    • An Adaptive Design for the Efficient Estimation of Temporal Preferences
    • Disordered system: Variation in material versus relational power and interstate conflict
    • Dynamics of Change in International Organizations
    • Likelihood-free Inference in Strategic Contexts
    • Measurement Precision versus User Fatigue: Temporal Discounting in Politics
    • Measuring International Order: Three Approaches to an Amorphous Concept
    • Only Doves could send Nixon to China
    • Public Opinion, Democratic Institutions, and Leader Credibility
    • Refining known unknowns? Modeling and Measuring Uncertainty
    • Survey Experiments as Supervised Learning
    • The Power to Hurt and Public Support for War
    • The Power to Hurt, to be Hurt, and Public Support for War
    • The Trilemma of Hegemonic Order Competition
    • Warring Leviathans: Conflict Among Hierarchies and the Evolution of Human Prosociality
  • Research
  • Teaching

Public Opinion, Democratic Institutions, and Leader Credibility

Christopher Gelpi
Maël van Beek
Maël van Beek
Type
Manuscript

This paper researches how democratic backsliding impact the ability of credibility of leaders abroad by distinguishing between the effects of domestic polarization and of weakening democratic institutions.

Ongoing Public Preferences and International Bargaining Survey Experiments

© 2024 Maël van Beek.